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D I A L O G U E

Setting the Bar for “Injury”
in Environmental Exposure
Cases: How Low Can It Go?
Summary
On May 16, 2012, ELI convened a panel of experts
to provide an overview and analysis of the tension
between regulatory and common-law standards for
injury in the context of toxic tort litigation. The speakers discussed and debated emerging trends in toxic
tort litigation, including claims for property damage
or medical monitoring regarding exposure to environmental contamination that never exceeds applicable regulatory standards. The panel also analyzed
recent court opinions on the bounds of “injury” in
environmental contamination cases and the potential
for plaintiffs to recover damages based upon relatively
low concentrations of chemicals. Issues explored by
the panel included so-called single molecule theories
of toxicological harm, the admissibility of expert testimony in support of such theories, and related federal
or constitutional law theories, such as preemption,
separation of powers and equal protection.
Speakers:
John C. Cruden, President, Environmental Law Institute
(moderator)
Carla Burke, Shareholder, Baron & Budd, P.C.
John Guttmann, Shareholder, Beveridge & Diamond,
P.C.
Robert V. Percival, Professor of Law & Director,
Environmental Law Program, University of Maryland
Carey School of Law
John Cruden: Without question, in the last few years of
the [U.S.] Supreme Court practice, the most significant
decision was decided just last June. It was the American
Electric Power (AEP)1 case, which dealt with the issue of
whether or not a group of states and others could sue power
plants for greenhouse gas (GHG) issues. It came up as a
procedural challenge, because it had been allowed in the
[U.S. Court of Appeals for the] Second Circuit in an inter1.	

American Electric Power (AEP) v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 41 ELR
20210 (2011).
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esting way, by just two judges, because the third judge on
that panel had been then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor before
she was elevated to the Supreme Court. Justice Sotomayor
recused herself, making it an eight-person Supreme Court
listening to what had been a case before two judges out of
the Second Circuit. As all of you know, the Supreme Court
decided that that case could not go forward, but that is not
what I’m going to focus on.
I want you to concentrate a bit on the language by the
author of this opinion, Justice [Ruth Bader] Ginsburg, who
says this about federal common law: “As we all learned in
law school, there is no federal common law,” and then cites
probably one of the most influential law review articles of
all time by Judge [Henry] Friendly.2
She says:
Erie left to the states what ought to be left to them and thus
required federal courts to follow state decisions on matters
of substantive law appropriately cognizable by the states.
The new federal law addresses subjects within national legislative power where Congress has so directed or where the
basic scheme of the [U.S.] Constitution so demands.

Here, citing the Milwaukee I3 case, “When we deal with
air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there
is a federal common law.” And then later on goes on to
say: “And we have recognized that public nuisance law, like
common law generally, adapts to changing scientific and
factual circumstances.”
Without question, the Supreme Court did not allow
that challenge to go forward. That language is expressive
and broad in terms of what a federal common law may or
could be. There were things that were not really decided
by the Supreme Court in AEP, very specifically the role of
states, whether or not state common law would in fact not
be so much preempted as set aside.
Right now, pending before the [U.S. Court of Appeals
for the] Ninth Circuit is a case that raises some of those
issues, Village of Kivalina.4 In AEP, the parties were actually seeking what we would all call injunctive relief to
actually put a cap on carbon emissions by those emitting
2.	
3.	
4.	

Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964).
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 2 ELR 20201 (1972).
Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 87780, 39 ELR 236 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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sources. Not true in the City case. It’s a money case that is
fundamentally different.
Kivalina is an Eskimo village of approximately 400
people located on the tip of a six-mile barrier reef on the
northwest coast of Alaska, about 70 miles north of the Arctic Circle. Both the [U.S. Army] Corps of Engineers and
the [U.S.] Government Accountability Office (GAO) have
both stated that the residents need to move because they’re
protected from weather and high storm events by the Arctic ice, and the Arctic ice is in fact evaporating allegedly
due to GHGs, and moving costs money. So, the city and
tribe sued to get the people that they say contributed to
the problem that we now have under common law, and
they want money damages. It’s been argued to the Ninth
Circuit and we’re waiting for a decision now.
Let me turn to the people who are going to talk to you
about this interesting intersection between common-law
issues and regulatory issues.
Prof. Bob Percival of the University of Maryland is a
recognized expert in environmental issues, one of the leading scholars of the nation on environmental law. He joined
the Maryland faculty in 1987 after having been a senior
litigator for the Environmental Defense Fund. He currently teaches environmental law, a global environmental
law seminar, constitutional law, and administrative law. In
2007, he was named the University’s Teacher of the Year.
Carla Burke is one of the leaders of Baron & Budd’s
water contamination litigation group. She’s been actively
involved in the MTBE [methyl tertiary butyl ether] multidistrict litigation cases. She’s authored numerous papers
and presentations on the topics of toxic tort and water contamination litigation and liability law.
John Guttmann is a principal at Beveridge & Diamond.
He is well-known as one of the leading litigators of the
nation in this area. His practice is devoted to both trial
and appellate litigation in commercial, securities, and environmental cases. He served as lead counsel for clients in
numerous cases under virtually every federal [environmental] statute. He’s litigated many of them to conclusion. He’s
litigated cases before DOI’s [U.S. Department of the Interior’s] Board of Land Appeals. He, too, has been involved
in MTBE product liability case and is a member of the
defense steering committee for the refining industry in
those cases.

I.

The Common Law of Environmental
Torts

Robert Percival: I would like to begin by discussing a bit
about the history of the common law of environmental
torts. Most of our regulatory statutes are fairly recent in
origin, being implemented only within the last 40 years,
and people often forget that we have a long Anglo-American tradition of common-law tort litigation involving
environmental issues that extends back over 400 years. The
early cases all involved situations in which there existed
a large, single source of pollution that was causing vis-
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ible environmental harm. Nonetheless, these cases helped
establish some of the bedrock principles of the common
law that govern today.
Aldred’s Case5 in 1611 in England was the first time a
British court recognized that even a non-trespassory invasion of property could be actionable if it interfered with
someone’s quiet use and enjoyment of land; in that case,
a pig sty. The principle that you had the right to use your
property as you please, but you had a responsibility to
ensure that you didn’t cause significant harm to others, was
established by the British courts early in the 18th century.
In 1862, in Bamford v. Turnley,6 the British court said
that it was not a requirement to prove preexisting violations
of regulatory standards in order to establish tort liability.
Therefore, even if one was in compliance with existing
regulations, you could still be held liable if you were doing
something that caused significant harm to another.
In the early 20th century, there were intense disputes
between states over interstate pollution that were heard by
the Supreme Court exercising its original jurisdiction. The
first of these was Missouri v. Illinois7 in 1906, a case involving whether or not Chicago should be stopped from dumping its raw sewage in a new drainage canal that would take
it to the Mississippi River, the source of drinking water for
St. Louis. At the beginning of his opinion for the Court,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted that if this suit had
been brought 50 years ago, it almost necessarily would
have failed, due to an absence of visible harm. However, he
observed that the germ theory of disease recently had come
to be accepted, improving society’s understanding of environmental causes of harm. Missouri failed to convince the
Court that the dumping of sewage by Chicago had caused
it harm, but a year later, Georgia won an injunction from
the Court to slash emissions from a smelter in Tennessee
that can destroy all vegetation over a wide area.8
Today, though, environmental torts face what I have
called in some of my academic writings the “causation
conundrum.” We no longer live in a world where single,
large sources of pollution, such as some of the old smelters,
cause so much highly visible harm that it is easy to prove
causation. Instead, we are now awash in a sea of low-level
exposures to multiple pollutants from multiple sources.
Thus, it is extremely difficult to prove that it is more probable than not that one particular source caused a particular
harm. An exception to this situation are cases of asbestos
exposure where the chemical is uniquely related to some
sort of signature injury, i.e., mesothelioma and asbestosis.
But in the absence of exposure to chemicals that cause signature injury, proof of causation can be very difficult in
environmental tort cases.
In recent years, there have been some efforts to relax
traditional causation doctrines in order to cope with this
problem, particularly in situations where people have been
5.	
6.	
7.	
8.	

Aldred’s Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57 b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1610).
Bamford v. Turnley, 3 B & S. 67, 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (Exch. Ch. 1862).
Missouri v. Illinois, 202 U.S. 598 (1906).
Goergia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
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exposed to a toxic chemical that is likely to, in a probabilistic fashion, cause harm to some of them, although we
cannot tell specifically which of them.
In 1980, when [the U.S.] Congress adopted the Superfund legislation, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),9
the word compensation was in the statute because it was
anticipated that the law would include a program for
administrative compensation of those exposed to toxins
due to their proximity to polluted landfills. On a close vote,
however, Congress eliminated this from the program, fearful that it would open up the floodgates too much due to
the difficulty of determining who should be compensated.
Instead, CERCLA focused on relaxing causation standards
in determining who can be held liable for the cost of environmental cleanups.
During the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States
was involved in a nuclear arms race with the Soviet
Union. In some years, the U.S. government tested an
average of one nuclear weapon per week in the atmosphere at the Nevada test range. Mushroom clouds from
these explosions were visible from casinos in Las Vegas.
As a result, people who lived near the Nevada test range
were exposed to dangerous levels of radiation. Decades
later, people with diseases that can be caused by radiation
exposure brought suit. A creative federal district judge
in Utah decided that in the circumstances, normal standards for proof of causation could be relaxed somewhat.
He held that if individuals could prove that they were
exposed to significant amounts of radiation from the
testing and that they suffered certain types of diseases
capable of being caused by radiation exposure, then the
burden would shift to the government to prove that it
had not caused the harm. Unfortunately, that decision,
Allen v. United States,10 was reversed by the [U.S. Court
of Appeals for the] Tenth Circuit on other grounds—that
the government was exempt from liability because of the
discretionary function exemption to tort liability under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.
In recent years, a number of other countries have tried
to deal with the problem of proving causation in environmental tort cases by shifting the burden of proving
causal injury. The Chinese Code of Civil Procedure shifts
the burden of proof to polluters to disprove causation in
certain circumstances.11 Once plaintiffs demonstrate that
they have suffered harm associated with exposure to envi-

ronmental pollutants, Chinese law authorizes shifting the
burden to defendants to disprove that their discharges of
those pollutants caused the harm. In April 2009, China’s
Supreme People’s Court awarded damages against a textile mill for harm to a fish farm that occurred in 1994
because the textile mill could not disprove that its discharges were the source of the harm.12 Notice, however,
that it also takes the Chinese legal system a long time to
resolve those cases.
In the aftermath of the Minamata tragedy, where mercury dumped into the harbor of a small fishing village from
1932 to 1968 caused widespread birth defects in children,
Japan has adopted a number of innovative measures for
compensating victims of environmental harm without
having to prove individualized causation.
In 1969, Japan adopted the Law Concerning Special
Measures for the Relief of Pollution-Related Health Damage.13 This legislation designated certain highly polluted
geographic areas and mandated that the government provide health benefits to residents certified as having pollution-induced health damage. Later, Japan adopted the
Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation Law14
that refined this program of using geographic-based certifications for determining who was eligible to recover. Even
though Japan has cut back on those compensation programs, the recent Tokyo air pollution lawsuits resulted
in a very large ¥1.2 billion settlement in a lawsuit against
city governments and the local automobile manufacturers for smog that harmed people living in the vicinity of
the expressway.15
Creative efforts are being made to construct a settlement
for damage claims from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil
spill. The settlement uses geography-based presumptions to
deal with this issue of how far to cast the net of compensation. The settlement does some very creative things that
can be viewed on the website, www.deepwaterhorizonsettlements.com.16
There are separate programs for economic and property
damages and for medical benefits where causation is essentially presumed if you live in certain areas that were heavily
polluted by the spill. These zones can be viewed by going to
the website and clicking on these maps under the “Settlement Agreements” tab. An individual who falls into certain
categories of people who claim to have suffered injury does
not have to prove individualized causation in order to be
eligible to file claims under the settlement.

9.	 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675, ELR Stat. CERCLA §§101-405.
10. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev’d, 816 F.2d
1417 (10th Cir. 1988).
11. See Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil
Procedures, art. 4 (promulgated by the Judicial Committee of the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 6, 2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002). Burden-shifting provisions
also are contained in Article 86 of China’s Solid Waste Pollution Control
Law and Article 87 of its Water Pollution Control Law. See Law of the
People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes, art. 86 (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005); Law of the
People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, art. 87 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Feb. 28, 2008, effective June 1, 2008).

12. See Zhang Changjian et al. v. Rongping Chemical Plant (on file with author). This case is discussed in Robert Percival, Liability for Environmental Harm and Emerging Global Environmental Law, 25 Md. J. Int’l L. 37
(2010).
13. Law Concerning Special Measures for the Relief of Pollution-Related
Health Damage, Law No. 90 of 1969 (Japan).
14. Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation Law, Law No. 111 of
1973 (Japan).
15. The Tokyo Air Pollution Lawsuit, 1885 HANJI 23 (Tokyo D. Ct., Oct. 29,
2002). Eri Osaka, Reevaluating the Role of the Tort Liability System in Japan,
26 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 393, 421 (2009).
16. Deepwater Horizon: Court-Supervised Settlement Program, http://www.
deepwaterhorizonsettlements.com.
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There also is an authorization of a risk transfer premium
to cover possible future losses, inconvenience, aggravation,
and emotional distress. If you are in the tourism industry,
for example, you can recover 2.5 times your demonstrated
injuries; seafood processers, three times; and fishing boat
owners, 8.75 times.
For claims of medical harm, there are presumptions
favoring those who worked on the cleanup between April
2010 and April 2012, as well as for those who resided in
certain specified beachfront areas who have specified physical conditions that arose prior to September 30, 2010, or
December 31, 2010. There are also provisions for people
who do not manifest these medical harms until later.
It seems that around the world law is getting more creative when determining how best to deal with this issue of
overcoming the causation conundrum. Legal systems are
adapting, due to the increasing recognition that environmental torts defy the traditional civil litigation paradigm
of A strikes B, where it is clear that there exists a single
tortfeasor and a single victim, allowing one to easily assess
what harm was done. Some have argued that the climate
change litigation to which John referred is going to have a
major impact on influencing the development of tort law
in the future. Given the vast array of sources of GHGs,
and the diffuse nature of the harm from climate change,
these cases certainly challenge the traditional “A struck B”
paradigm of civil litigation.
American Electric Power17 confirms one of the essential lessons that we should bear in mind: the tort system
serves as an essential backstop when the regulatory system
fails to prevent environmental harm. In American Electric
Power, the Court dismissed the suit because the [U.S.]
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) successfully
asserted its ability to regulate the source of climate change,
GHG emissions, under the Clean Air Act (CAA).18 If this
authority is repealed by Congress in the future, these suits
presumably would no longer be preempted, and the centuries-old backstop of environmental tort litigation would be
restored. Thank you.

II.

A Plaintiff Perspective

Carla Burke: Hello, everyone. I am Carla Burke. I’m a
plaintiff’s attorney, so I appreciate being welcomed here.
We’re not welcomed everywhere. This is actually a really
good panel for these issues. Mr. Guttmann and I have been
litigating against each other in MTBE cases for about seven
years, so we have fought out some of these things before,
and we’re happy to talk about them from both sides today.
So, let me tell you who I am and what I do, so you will
understand my perspective on a couple of topics. Most of
my work every day is in representing public drinking water
providers all across the United States, except for Texas,
which is my home state. We don’t do environmental litiga17. American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 41 ELR
20210 (2011).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618.
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tion in Texas. We rely on regulators to do that in Texas.
We can spend all day on that. Anyway, public drinking
water providers who have some kind of chemical contamination in their drinking water supply. That chemical can
be anything. We’ll talk about MTBE in a minute. It can
be a pesticide or an herbicide or some kind of industrial,
chemical, or solvent.
They find some chemical in their water supply and they
call us, and what we try to do for them is to recover money,
so that they can remove that chemical from their water
before they serve it to the residents, so pretty straightforward. We tend to do that in common-law claims, and to
us, it seems very easy. It’s a property damage case. You’ve
interfered with our right to provide water, and we file a
lawsuit. It’s not really that easy though. I’m going to use
MTBE as the example here.
We represented in an MDL, which is a multidistrict
litigation. MDL, for the non-lawyers, is a consolidation of
similar lawsuits from anywhere in the United States. So,
right now, there has been an MDL court established in the
Southern District of New York under Judge Shira Scheindlin. She has had these cases since, I think, 2003, 2004. So,
any case that is filed in the United States that alleges similar harm, similar case against the same defendant could
be removed to federal court. And if it’s removed to federal
court from state court, it would be transferred to Judge
Scheindlin’s court.
The goals are, of course, effective litigation, efficient use
of resources, etc. From a plaintiff’s perspective and probably
from a defendant’s perspective, there are risks to that: both
sides risk having one judge who does not agree with your
side. So, now all of your cases are consolidated in front of
one judge who doesn’t buy your arguments and opinions.
That’s very risky. Maybe it’s better to have 12 different state
court judges, each of whom has a different opinion.
Anyway, we’ve been in front of Judge Scheindlin, so
when we talk about MTBE, we’re really talking about one
judge’s opinion of the case. She has published dozens of
opinions. If you look them up on Westlaw or Lexis, you’ll
find them. But it’s important to remember that this is not
a consensus of opinions from across the nation; it is just
Judge Scheindlin. Now, she’s a very thorough, analytic,
and careful judge, and very, very smart, so we’re confident
that she reaches the right results, but it’s something to keep
in mind.
MTBE is a gasoline additive. It was intended to increase
the oxygen content of gasoline and to reduce vehicle emissions, and it was blended into gasoline by refiners as lead
was phased out. So, starting in the late 1970s, early 1980s,
MTBE was blended into gasoline. Almost immediately,
people started reporting groundwater contamination.
MTBE was turning up in drinking water, wherever it was
used. There are many reasons for that. We don’t need to
discuss all the possibilities of tanks leaking and et cetera,
et cetera, but just know that there are a lot of ways that
MTBE can get into the environment.
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So, water providers across the country started dealing
with this MTBE issue. What is it? Why is it making our
water smell funny and taste bad? How can we get rid of it?
What we did in the cases is a little different from, I think,
what most people think of as an environmental approach.
We did not look for nearby gasoline stations that had leaking tanks. We looked at the manufacturers of MTBE and
the manufacturers of gasoline containing MTBE, i.e.,
refiners in the United States. We said when you chose to
sell that product, when you chose to blend MTBE into
gasoline and to sell gasoline containing MTBE, you sold a
defective product. You knew about its risks to the environment and you didn’t warn about the risks. You didn’t use a
safer alternative. That’s a pretty straightforward commonlaw claim in every state.
So, we planted ourselves in common-law territory and
didn’t expect the regulatory aspect to come into play. Enter
my colleagues on the other side of the bar who raised a creative defense, which was to look at the water quality regulations in each state. The argument goes like this. I don’t
want to spoil it too much, but I can give the broad lines. If
the level of MTBE in the water—in the drinking water—
is below the maximum that is allowed by federal or state
regulation, then the water provider can continue legally to
serve that water to the public. If the water provider can
continue to legally serve the water to the public, the water
provider is not harmed by the presence of MTBE.
Now, our response to that was that those two don’t fit
together. That water quality regulations govern a water provider’s conduct in providing water to the public. Water quality regulations do not address a third party’s conduct. They
do not speak to a polluter’s conduct. They do not address a
manufacturer’s duty not to sell a defective product. To us, it
was apples and paperclips. It just didn’t add up.
And instead of using a standard, as a bright-line measure
for when a plaintiff, a water provider, was injured, we said a
court should not just adopt this as a bright-line measure. A
court should conduct a factual inquiry and should look at
how the water provider is affected by the level of chemical
in the water, no matter what the level is. Are they affected
by the amount of MTBE below the regulatory level? That
has been our model, and those are the arguments that we
make in every single one of our cases, whether it’s MTBE;
it could be atrazine, which is a case I’ve been litigating now
for several years. Atrazine is an herbicide, a weed killer that
is used in agricultural areas. It could be PCE used for dry
cleaning. This issue has come up in every single one of
those cases.
Also, in every one of those cases, we have one on that
issue on getting the court to refuse to adopt it as a measure
of injury per se, and to look at how the water provider was
actually affected. So, courts have been pretty receptive to
that argument, and I think there are reasons that courts are
more receptive.
You can look, by the way, at Judge Scheindlin’s opinion
out of the MTBE MDL. She looks at all of the previous
cases around the country. She was trying to look for prec-
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edent for how does this come out, because there are not
cases out there that have a products liability action in an
environmental context with the presence of a regulation.
There really aren’t those kinds of cases out there. Judge
Scheindlin looked at every possible case and kind of pulled
principles from different areas of the law. So, her opinion
does a pretty good job of setting up a landscape in drawing
her own conclusions.
One of the things that is persuasive to courts is evidence
that we show of how the water provider actually does
respond to the level of chemical that is below the regulatory limit. Certainly, water providers use the regulatory
limit, I guess, as an outer edge for what is acceptable to
them. What they want to avoid more than anything is to
reach that level or exceed it, but they cannot operate just
below it. They have to build in a level of sort of a safety level
for this sort of buffer. So, they may have an internal policy
that they take action when the level of chemical reaches
one-half the MCL.
So, if we can show the court that this particular water
provider takes an action at a lower than MCL level, maybe
changes water supply or uses an available treatment technology or even provides bottled water, whatever the case
may be, judges seem to find that persuasive.
They also find persuasive evidence of scientific disagreement about the health effects of that chemical at different
levels of concentration or different types of exposure. There
are not a lot of studies that look at health effects of lowlevel chronic ingestion of chemicals, which is what drinking water, when you think about it, what drinking water is.
It’s not an accident where there is a high level of exposure
to something. It’s a little bit of chemical all day long as you
drink your water. So, there are many questions and a lot of
debate about various chemicals.
I mentioned atrazine earlier. Right now, atrazine is sort
of a hot topic on the regulatory side. EPA is looking very
closely at atrazine. The primary manufacturer of the active
ingredient atrazine is Syngenta. Syngenta has been diligent
in defending its product and in performing lots of scientific studies that are published everywhere showing how
safe its product is. At the same time, there are independent
scientific experts looking at atrazine and reaching opposite conclusions and saying not only is atrazine not safe, it’s
not safe at any level, and it’s an endocrine disruptor. So,
it doesn’t follow the traditional dose-response curve that
we’re all used to. It follows an entirely different pattern. In
fact, low levels of atrazine are much more dangerous than
high levels of atrazine. So, if you put all of that type of
information before a court, a judge is likely to understand
that it’s reasonable for that water provider to want to take
an action at a level below the regulatory limit.
The third thing that courts tend to find persuasive is if
we have evidence of a political battle over a chemical, then
they could see that health is not the sole motivating factor
in arriving at this level. That has been pretty persuasive in
the case of atrazine, certainly. So, those are the types of
evidence that courts tend to really see as persuasive, and
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that is considered, I think, compellingly against the backdrop of considerations of preemption and concerns about
the role of regulation and the role of the tort system.
So, the Supreme Court said in response, okay, look.
The FDA [Food and Drug Administration] is a little outmanned here. There are 11,000 drugs out there. The FDA
has limited resources, and it’s the manufacturers of these
drugs who have superior knowledge about the effects of
the drugs, the potential risks associated, the dangers of the
drugs. And there was not an attempt by FDA to become
an expert on every drug, nor was there an attempt by FDA
to fully occupy the field and preempt the states from taking their own action. I mean, I can directly analogize that
to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),19 which is the
regulation at issue in all of our cases. The SDWA expressly
states that states may impose more stringent standards if
they choose.
You see that with California in particular. It tends to
have slightly lower MCLs or maximum contaminant levels
for chemicals than EPA. It’s easier to do on a state-by-state
basis, I would imagine, and there are different political
forces at play. But the Supreme Court recognized that the
Food and Drug Act gives consumers some minimal protection, but the state tort system could maximize protections
if they wanted to. Through the tort system, we could discover more about the health risk of drugs, etc.

III. A Defense Perspective
John Guttmann: Well, thank you everyone for coming today, and I appreciate the opportunity to be on this
great panel talking about these interesting topics. But the
first thing I want to say is this: Carla indicated that we’ve
been kind of locking horns on these issues for a long, long
time—she and I and our two firms—in MTBE and also
in some other contexts outside of MTBE, including PCE
[perchloroethylene], for example. But a lot of it, as she said,
is in front of Judge Scheindlin in the [U.S. District Court
for the] Southern District [of New York].
I just want to say in this public place on the record today
that I completely agree with my colleague here that Judge
Scheindlin is thoughtful and careful and deserving of the
utmost respect, even when I disagree with her, so let that
be noted. Let it also be noted, by the way, that some of
the rulings that Carla mentioned are in the Second Circuit
at the moment subject to review, but I’m not going to go
there. What I’d like to do is start with sort of a hypothetical. Bear with me, because it’s not really a concrete, factual
hypothetical, but just to kind of provide a little context,
because I’m going to respond to some of the things that
both Bob and Carla said and also talk about a few other
issues. But anyway, here’s the kind of scenario I think we
live with today.
Science today is—as it always is—constantly improving. One of the results of that is that there is an increasing
ability all the time to detect chemicals at lower levels in the
19.

42 U.S.C. §§300f to 300j-26, ELR Stat. SDWA §§1401-1465.
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environment, whether we’re talking about air, water, where
we are in litigation all the time together, or soil contamination. Chemicals can be found at levels way below regulatory standards. So, that’s really a key aspect, I think, of
what we’re talking about today, is that the science is getting
better and better at this.
We have plaintiffs who argue, as Carla just indicated,
I think, that sometimes there is no safe level of exposure.
In some contexts, a single dose, a single molecule can be
enough from a plaintiff’s perspective to raise a risk or cause
an injury. Sometimes, these cases arise in the absence of
direct evidence that the chemical was in a plaintiff’s body
in a personal injury case. What the plaintiff alleges is that
the circumstances show that it would be in my body.20 I’ll
come back to that in a second.
What it really means is that the plaintiff says the chemical has to be in my body because of the frequency and
regularity of my exposure and my proximity to the source,
if it’s an air or water issue. I drink the water all the time.
And plaintiffs’ experts will argue that even in the absence
of the direct evidence that you can find from medical tests,
the exposure is there, the alteration of the body is there.
That equals an injury or, depending on state law, it equals
an increased risk. Therefore, plaintiff says, I’m entitled to
damages for present personal injury, for emotional distress,
for fear of cancer—conceptually that can be different from
other forms of emotional distress—for medical monitoring. I’ll talk about the water providers in a minute in terms
of their injuries.
But I wanted to say one other thing, just kind of as a
backdrop in setting the table. There are cases going both
ways, as Carla suggested, on this issue of whether contamination in the environment that is below a regulatory level,
be it an MCL in water, which in many cases are established
at the state level as she noted, or some other federal standard or a guideline. There are cases going both ways on
the question of whether or not the contamination below
those levels can constitute an injury. I think, given the time
issues, enough said. If anybody is interested, we can talk
about specific cases later, or I’ll be happy to send you summaries of them. But they go both ways on that.21
20. National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, 22 F. Supp.
2d 942, 946 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (aflatoxin, occupational exposure); Merry
v. Westinghouse, 684 F. Supp. 847, 851, 18 ELR 21218 (M.D. Pa. 1988)
(PCBs, drinking water); Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1433
(5th Cir. 1989) (herbicide, occupational exposure).
21. In re MTBE Products Liability Litig., 458 F. Supp. 2d 149, 158 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (“While the MCL may serve as a convenient guidepost in determining that a particular level of contamination has likely caused an injury, the
MCL does not define whether an injury has occurred.”); Adams v. A.J. Ballard Jr. Tire & Oil Co. Inc., Nos. 01-CVS-1271, 03-CVS-912, 03-CVS1124, 2006 WL 1875965, at *3 (Sup. Ct. N.C. June 30, 2006) (“[U]nless
each Plaintiff [must] establish the existence of concentrations of MTBE or
other contaminants sufficient to violate the state groundwater quality standards, they do not have standing to pursue their claims at trial and their
claims must be dismissed.”); Bentley v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 223 F.R.D.
471, 478 n.11 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (“Regardless of whether the municipal
water supply has been deemed safe by the Ohio EPA and/or determined
to be below the federal and state established maximum contaminant levels
(MCL), the [plaintiffs] still may have suffered diminution in their property
values . . . .”); In re Wildewood Litig., 52 F.3d 499, 503 (4th Cir. 1995)
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The other thing I was going to say at this point is it’s
important to remember that there’s a distinction between
regulatory standards and a tort plaintiff’s burden of proof,
regardless of who the plaintiff is. And I’ll come to different categories of plaintiffs momentarily. By and large, there
are differences in statutory language, differences in legislative preambles, all that sort of thing, differences in statements in the Federal Register. But as a general proposition,
regulatory standards are established as prophylactic rules
to protect public health, which is a different question from
whether injury has been caused to a specific plaintiff in a
specific case. Bob was describing a situation abroad where
things may be shifting a little bit. But in tort litigation,
it’s important to remember that, in the United States, it’s
incumbent upon the plaintiff in a particular case to establish injury.
So, let me turn to the defense perspective on a lot of
these questions. It’s important to recognize, as Carla noted,
these are state law issues, by and large. In some states, talking just about the personal injuries, for example, in some
states, you have to have a present physical injury to be entitled to medical monitoring. There are other states where
you don’t have to have an illness, but where exposure and
the presence of the chemical in the body or maybe just
exposure, even without an illness, might provide a basis
for a medical monitoring claim. In terms of how courts
view these claims, it may depend on the type of plaintiff
you’re dealing with. It also may be influenced by the type
of claim, the legal theory involved. And it most definitely
will be influenced by the type of injury that’s alleged.
So, let me just take a moment and review them and
explain what I’m suggesting. There are a variety of categories of plaintiffs who can raise an environmental tort claim.
One, Carla and I deal with it on a day-to-day basis, is the
water providers.22 The water providers say the contamination is in the water we pull out of our wells. That’s an injury
to us because we’ve got to treat it. Judge Scheindlin has said
that the MCL does not define whether a water provider
has suffered an injury.23 Carla has laid out, I think quite
nicely, why that is in Judge Scheindlin’s view, because the
water provider sees a need potentially to treat—to test and
treat—at lower levels of contamination. So, she has said in
her decision that the MCL may be a guideline, but it’s not
a bright line.
But a second category of plaintiffs would be privateproperty owners, private well owners in particular if we’re
talking about water. Judge Scheindlin said in her decision
that the MCL may have more relevance in that context
than it does in the context of a water provider, because an
MCL is established to provide a margin of safety from a
health point of view.24 We could debate that one all day
long, and I don’t mean to go into it. I simply want to

make the point that a private well owner actually stands
in a different position than that public water provider. It
may influence how courts view these issues. States can
be plaintiffs in these cases, and that’s a significant factor as well, because if the state steps forward exercising
its parens patriae rights to protect water, for example, it
will be viewed very differently by any court than either a
water provider or a private plaintiff.
The claims, I think, have been laid out, so I’m not going
to spend any time on them other than to say negligence,
maybe product liability as with MTBE, nuisance, trespass,
possibly strict liability for ultrahazardous activities depending on what we’re talking about, statutory claims for consumer protection, and the like. But the key thing I want
to spend just a moment on is the types of injuries, because
I think that really is the critical issue that ties back to the
type of plaintiff.
We can have property damage claims. That’s what the
public water provider is bringing. And the issue is, has
there been causation of an injury to that water provider?
And we’ve talked about Judge Scheindlin’s ruling on that.
So, that involves cost of water treatment and remediation.
Those costs, though, can also be brought, be incurred, and
part of the claim for damages by the private well owner
plaintiff. Personal injury is obviously there with those private well owners or property owners if they’re claiming soil
contamination.25 There’s dioxin sediments in my backyard,
would be an example.
Medical monitoring, I mentioned already. Sometimes,
you have to have a physical injury, sometimes you don’t.
It’s a function of state law.26 Damages for emotional distress—you typically would have to show verifiable presence
of the toxin in the body. In some states, though, you would
actually have to show a present injury.27
When we get to the states, and this is an important one
and I would suggest this is going to be an area of future litigation big-time involving claims of contamination below
regulatory standards—and the gentleman on my right has
already been involved in this in his prior lifetime—natural resource damage claims brought by states. States have
arguments, as I said, that other plaintiffs don’t have. The
key question it will boil down to there, has the resource
been injured? And in that regard, has there been a loss of
services is a key question. If water can still be delivered to
the public, from my perspective as a defense lawyer, there’s
a compelling argument that there hasn’t been a loss of services in terms of the impact on the resource.
The key message, though, in all of these is what Bob
said at the outset, and it was great that he set up my line,
because my basic message today is you have to look at all
these issues in the context of all these plaintiffs and all these

(Contamination must “rise to the level of toxicological concern” before
plaintiffs can pursue common-law actions.).
22. Developments in Toxic Tort Liability for the Quality of Groundwater Served, 49
Ariz. L. Rev. 469, *485 (2007).
23. In re MTBE Products Liability Litig., 458 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
24. Id. 458 F. Supp. 2d at 155.

25. See, e.g., In re MTBE Products Liability Litig.
26. Exxon v. Ford, No. 1804, 2012 Md. App. LEXIS 16, **105-07 (Md. App.
2012); Rhodes v. E.I. DuPont 253 F.R.D. 365, 372-73 (S.D.W. Va. 2008).
27. Exxon, No. 1804 at *78 (“It is enough that the fear be based on a substantial and medically verifiable possibility of contracting the disease.”); In re
MTBE Products Liability Litig, 528 F. Supp. 2d 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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claims through the prism of causation. That’s the bottomline question in all of these.
Under Daubert [v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals], which
those of you who are lawyers know was the seminal case
from the Supreme Court defining a federal court’s role
in assessing the admissibility of expert testimony (and all
these things hinge on expert testimony28), the Court is
playing a gatekeeper function. And even if we’re in a state
court that doesn’t apply that rule, under the old traditional
test in other words, the court still plays a role in reviewing
the reliability of the testimony of experts.
So, remember it’s the proponent of the expert who has
the burden. It’s Carla when we are in litigation together
who is trying to establish the injury. It’s the plaintiff’s burden in that context to demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that the expert’s proof is reliable. Obviously,
it’s my burden with respect to a defense expert. But if we’re
trying to establish injury in the first instance, the plaintiff
has the burden of proof to show injury; the plaintiff has
the burden of proof to put forth reliable scientific evidence
to support it.
So, the question that I ask, and that is, as a defense lawyer you have to ask, is the evidence reliable for—not in an
abstract sense—but for purposes of helping this plaintiff
meet his or her burden of proof at the low levels of contamination below an MCL or other standard that we’re talking
about, even if it would be reliable at higher levels? This gets
into this question of dose that Carla alluded to.
In looking at this, it’s important to remember that
regulatory standards are based on determinations of risk.
Epidemiology is based on assessments of risks, but there’s
a distinction between risk and causation when considering the burden of proof of the individual plaintiff. Even if
there’s risk, outside of those cases Bob talked about where
there’s a signature disease like mesothelioma, typically dose
and exposure are going to come into play. And as Carla
noted, at these very low levels, there aren’t many studies for
most chemicals.
So, from a defense perspective, what you want to look
at is in the absence of those studies, or if there are a few
studies, is there speculation built into the opinion of the
experts, however qualified the experts may be? Are there
gaps in the data that if they were filled could potentially
yield a different conclusion? But the bottom line is what
you’re assessing it through is causation, and Bob was right
on the money in saying that that was the critical issue.
Sometimes plaintiffs claim that these low levels of
contamination can lead to what are called biomarkers,
changes in the body at a sub-cellular level, DNA adducts.
What are DNA adducts? DNA adducts are a situation
where the chemical binds to the DNA and causes a change
in it. The argument is that this can lead to mutations; it
can lead to disease. Cytogenetic changes alter the chro-

mosomes, cause breaks or rearrangements in the chromosomes, things like that.29
The bottom line, though, is that many things in life can
cause these changes, and the question is, is it the chemical
exposure at these low levels that’s caused it? In some states,
under the law, DNA adducts, if the jury finds they were
caused by the chemical, that alone constitutes proof of an
injury, period.30 In other states, the DNA adducts aren’t
deemed to be an injury because they don’t necessarily lead
to a disease. We all have DNA adducts. They come from
apples, according to some studies; a variety of things, like
coffee that we’re exposed to. Many of us—I drink a lot of
coffee, so who knows what my chromosomes look like? But
you have to look at what it’s causing and where it leads.
So, here are the key questions in a personal injury case.
What’s the evidence that they’re in the body? Have there
been genetic tests? Have there been medical tests? Sometimes, the plaintiffs will argue, going back to my scenario
in the beginning, frequency of exposure, regularity of
exposure, proximity to a source. I can infer from that that’s
in the body. It might not be, but I think it’s more probable
than not than it is. Assuming they’re in the body, what’s the
risk of future disease? Does it justify medical monitoring at
these low levels in the absence of studies? If we’re talking
about the water providers, under Judge Scheindlin’s view,
and there are cases to the contrary, under Judge Scheindlin’s view, is the water provider in a position where that
lower level of contamination has led it to spend money, or
was it spending the money for some other reason? What
levels would a reasonable water provider take action in?
There are lots of questions, but they all boil down to the
issue of causation.
So, let me just return, if I may, to where we started.
With these low levels of contamination in the environment,
you’ve got to look at: what kind of plaintiff are you talking
about? What kind of alleged injury are you talking about?
Does this kind of plaintiff have a claim for contamination
below the MCL or whatever other regulatory standard is
at issue for this kind of alleged injury? Look to see if the
detection is getting ahead of the science. If the detection
level is getting ahead of science in other respects, I should
say, because even if there’s increased risk from exposure to
a chemical, is there sufficient evidence of causation for this
plaintiff alleging this injury to make a prima facie case that
it’s more probable than not that the exposure caused the
injury? Is there speculation? Are there gaps?
That’s key, because we are in a situation, as Carla noted,
where the science may be lagging behind. One area where
the science is ahead is the ability to detect things. But in
terms of analyzing the effects of these low levels, there’s
a lag, and the gap may never be filled. So, that’s how on
my side we look at these issues, and I’ll turn it back over
to John.

28. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 23 ELR 20979
(1993).

29. Genetics in the Courtroom: Genetics and Toxic Torts, 31 Seton Hall L. Rev.
949, 970 (2001).
30. In re MTBE Products Liability Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 303; James v. Chevron,
301 N.J. Super. 512 (N.J. Super. 1997).
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John Cruden: Bob, you gave us examples from both China
and Japan, but those are laws they enacted. If you’re going
to change what you call the causation conundrum, do you
have to have laws to do that, or is the evolving common law
capable of filling in gaps?
Robert Percival: I think the case of Allen v. United States
that I mentioned earlier is about the furthest we have seen a
U.S. court do that. Had that decision stood, it would have
really been a quiet sensible response to a situation where
it was clear that enormous harm had occurred due to the
exposure to the radioactive fallout, and yet, it was difficult
trying to sort out who should be able to recover. When
implementing the idea of identifying people who can show
exposure and who can show that they have suffered the
kind of injury that is related to that type of exposure, there
always will be problems of overinclusion and underinclusion. However, I thought that was a very creative way of
handling that issue in a circumstance where the government would have been the one held liable.
Then, we have the Superfund program. At the time the
program was enacted, many thought that we were going to
start seeing serious widespread health problems in people
who live near Superfund sites. Congress commissioned a
study to show that traditional doctrines of tort law were
just simply inadequate to cope with that type of injury,
which contributed to the momentum toward creating a victims’ compensation program. Instead, Congress decided to
focus on site cleanups while just putting it in a provision for
health assessments, which may have been a sensible choice
in light of the dearth of studies documenting severe health
problems in populations living near such sites.
However in a situation, like the radiation issue where
it was clear that many people were injured, Congress
responded after the Tenth Circuit reversed the Allen decision by adopting a program of administrative compensation for the victims of exposure to the nuclear testing and
for uranium miners as well.
John Cruden: Before I ask Carla and John if they have any
comments on yours, I need you to be a law professor one
more time, because we’re now in this intersection between
statutory and regulatory construct and the common law.
AEP talks about displacement. Other cases talk about preemption. What are preemption and displacement?
Robert Percival: I now am grading my Constitutional
Law exams, and I have a question in there about preemption, which is one of the things we study. I thought it was
particularly interesting that Carla mentioned Wyeth v.
Levine31 because the legal doctrine is actually fairly simple.
It is a matter of congressional intent: did Congress intend
to preempt or displace state law when it adopted a particular regulatory statue? And yet, we have a bizarre situa31. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
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tion with respect to preemption and therapeutic drugs. In
Wyeth, the Supreme Court held that state failure-to-warn
tort litigation was not preempted for the brand name drug,
but the Court subsequently held that it is preempted for
the chemically identical generic equivalent of the drug.
Therefore, whether or not one can even seek relief under
state tort law depends on whether it is a generic drug or the
actual brand name drug at issue. The Justices of the Court
agreed that this is crazy and that Congress should change
the law.
There usually is a presumption against preemption,
unless Congress has expressly indicated an intent to preempt. Yet, a line still has to be drawn in many cases. There
are situations in which congressional intent is uncertain,
but a court is going to have to decide how far the preemption extends. It is a mess that should probably be in Congress’ hands. However, as we all know, we have a totally
dysfunctional Congress, and it is likely that it is going to
continue, thus making it very unlikely that we are going
to get any help from them on this issue. Consequently this
issue will remain with the judges to sort out in the future.
Carla Burke: Bob, I’m just wondering about your opinion:
if there is legislative action taken on environmental issues
on the causation side, should that be a federally driven initiative, or should it be reserved to the states and let every
state kind of cook up its own?
Robert Percival: Some states have already taken action.
Minnesota has a program for a type of administrative
compensation for exposure to hazardous chemicals. This
reveals the possibility of the states acting as laboratories of
democracy by coming up with their own programs. Additionally, with its Proposition 65, California has been fairly
creative at adopting much more protective standards for
preventing exposure to carcinogens and reproductive toxins than anything that we have on the federal level.
The problem with respect to the issue of generic drugs
versus brand name drugs is a result of the way Congress
wrote the statute. Here, the Supreme Court’s reasoning
depended upon whether the manufacturer was free to
seek a label change from the FDA. With respect to generic
drugs, they said, “no,” and that it had to be absolutely identical. I am sure Congress never even contemplated the issue
of preemption in this context when it adopted the statute.
John Guttmann: Well, all I wanted to say is that the preemption issues, I think, in the tort context, are going to
be very dicey most of the time, because Congress doesn’t
necessarily speak clearly. And even when it does, there are
still issues about how far it goes. If I can return just for
a second back to Carla’s and my favorite subject, which
is MTBE, because there, the defendants, including yours
truly, argued that the claims were federally preempted for
a variety of reasons.
Their arguments boiled down to the fact that MTBE is
an approved oxygenate to be put into gasoline, and Con-
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gress knew it was going to be used, and EPA knew it was
going to be used, and knew how it behaved in water. Now,
there are big debates about what EPA knew and didn’t
know, but we don’t need to go there.
But here’s what Judge Scheindlin ruled on the issue. She
said—this is obviously a paraphrase—she said, you’re talking about whether these claims are preempted by the CAA.
The CAA regulates the composition of motor fuels. What
these cases are talking about, what the plaintiffs are complaining about is contamination of the water. That’s a different issue. So, she implied that claims might—she didn’t
say they are—be preempted, if we were dealing with issues
about claims related to air contamination. But these cases
deal with MTBE and water, and that’s beyond the scope,
in her view, of any preemption, assuming there is any.32
But I think it is clear that the CAA does preempt at least
certain types of claims with respect to the composition of
motor fuels.
There are other state judges who have ruled the other
way and who have said, this is a consequence of the stuff
being in gasoline, and I find preemption. There are several decisions in New York State and, I think, perhaps
elsewhere to that effect. So, the point I’m trying to make
simply is that you have to look again at the kind of claim
and the kind of injury you’re talking about, not just has
Congress dealt with this issue in some fashion.
John Cruden: I was in the Supreme Court hearing the
AEP case, and part of the concern by all the Justices was,
we’re going to have to make this stuff up. It’s enormously
scientific. This is GHGs, of all things, and we don’t want
to be a legislature. We’re not good at that. Carla, you must
be hearing all the time people saying, wait a minute, you’re
second-guessing a legislature. They’ve got the MCLs. The
MCLs have built-in safety margins. That’s what they’re
there for, precisely for that particular purpose. Aren’t
you really second-guessing now what those people who
are charged with that responsibility are doing? And your
answer is?
Carla Burke: Yes.
John Guttmann: That’s my answer too.
Carla Burke: I think you have to be very specific about
what the intent was in coming up with—I’m going to
stick with water—with an MCL, with the regulatory
standard. And if you look at the statute, EPA is charged
with setting a regulatory limit for contaminant in drinking water that is as close to its goal. There’s an MCLG
which is the MCL goal. So, if they set the enforceable
standard as close to the goal as possible taking cost and
other feasibility issues into account, so there are several
standards that EPA comes up with.
32. North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 615 F.3d 291, 302, 40 ELR
194 (4th Cir. 2010).
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The goal, the MCLG, is the most protective of health.
For a chemical like benzene, for example, the MCLG is 0,
but the enforceable MCL is 5 parts per billion. So, somewhere in there, EPA said, what we really want is zero, but
zero may not be feasible for everyone. It might be expensive
to get to zero. It might require fancy membrane treatment
systems. I don’t know what the arguments from the industry side were, but it might chill certain kinds of trade to
have a low MCL.
So, to the extent that there is space in there between feasible and absolutely are protective of health, we are saying
there is room in here, not to second-guess, but to supplement and to say that the regulatory goal and aim is a minimum safety standard. It’s a minimum. And if we as a state
want to enforce a more protective level via the tort system
or via a new regulation, we can do that. So, I wouldn’t say
second-guess. I would say supplement, which is friendlier
in any event.
John Guttmann: The question I want to ask Carla in
response is whether she would agree then that contamination levels below the goal might not give rise to run a cause
of action.
Carla Burke: As science changes and as we can detect
chemicals at lower and lower levels, people tend to respond
with, oh, well, maybe we should be removing it more and
more. Maybe the goal really should be zero. If you talk to
water providers, their goal in serving water to their communities is to have zero contaminants. They understand
that that’s not necessarily possible. But we want to get close
to zero.
Typically, over time, the MCL comes down and down
and down. I don’t remember off the top of my head, but
the benzene MCL used to be like 30 or 50 parts per billion. And remember, all this has happened in a pretty compressed period of time. These regulations went into effect
and water providers had to start following them in the
1980s, late 1980s or early 1990s. So, this is not a lot of the
time, and the regulations tend to drop over time. It’s rare
that EPA says, oh, wait, go ahead and have more of a given
chemical in your water. As it can be detected lower and as
we learn more about these things, the trend is always going
to be downward.
I think it depends on the chemical, frankly. Certain
things behave differently. Chemicals do not all behave the
same way in your body or in the environment. There are
things that a single-molecule theory fits better with. The
same chemical can have a no-threshold level with respect
to certain physical manifestations, and it can have a threshold level with respect to others. What does that mean?
Benzopyrene, I think, is a gasoline constituent. Benzopyrene can cause skin irritation at certain doses. So, a little
bit of it, it’s going to hurt you a little bit. A lot more would
cause more irritation, maybe some respiratory symptoms.
Benzopyrene also causes cancer, and it’s thought to be a
zero-safe level or single-molecule theory chemical for can-
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cer, so that it causes the kind of—John mentioned—DNA
mutation and cellular effects. That’s one of those chemicals
that’s thought to, with a single exposure, be able to cause
the kind of cellular change that would enable the genesis
of cancer.
So, chemicals are not the same, and I think that is something that is becoming more obvious in science. Unfortunately, I think where we all live, which is in the courtroom,
courts are a little behind the science on that. So, they tend
to want to treat all chemicals the same. They tend to want
to see a dose-response curve or a little is safe but a lot is
dangerous. And I think it’s something we’re going to, I‘m
sure, deal within the next several years as the sophisticated
nuances among these different chemicals and among the
different effects in the environment and effects in the
human body.

Some of these arguments I agree with wholeheartedly. I
agree with Carla that water providers and everybody in
this room, all of us would like H2O and nothing else. But
the reality is that water isn’t that simple. There’s naturally
occurring stuff in the water. There’s naturally occurring
stuff that’s harmful in water. If you live in the state of
New Hampshire, anyone on the phone, there may be high
levels of arsenic in your water, and that’s true in other
places as well.
So, the issue arises in these cases that my low levels
haven’t changed your regime of treating anything. So,
then you get into the issue, okay, if in fact we’re found
to be responsible, are we responsible for the whole ball of
wax or is it just an incremental cause that comes into play,
which is certainly what I would argue? Can I shift gears
completely, John?

John Cruden: John, there is this concept in water law of
total maximum daily load, the TMDL, The concept, of
course, is if you add things to a stream that already has a
bunch of junk in it, you actually have to know that. You
actually have to regulate it. Why isn’t that applicable here?
Why does it matter whether or not it’s just a little tiny bit if
you’re adding it to a water body, for instance, that already
has a bunch of contaminants in it?

John Cruden: You may.

John Guttmann: Well, if we’re talking about a water
body, then we’re going to be talking about typically claims
brought by the state or the federal government, as the case
may be in terms of contamination of a river, a lake, a stream,
and in a tort context as opposed to regulatory issues. And I
think that precisely those arguments are made and will be
made. And from the defense point of view, the argument
in a tort context would be it’s not what would be called an
indivisible injury, because each chemical or each substance
in the water has different effects and comes from different
sources. And certainly, in the case of my clients, it’s just a
little, itty-bitty bit of something that didn’t really add anything of significance to the mix, by and large. So, I think
that’s the argument.
In the other context that Carla and I deal with, dealing
with water providers, dealing with the plaintiffs claiming
personal injury, the issues come up in different ways. In the
personal injury context, generally different chemicals can
cause different effects in the body. Sometimes there can
be overlaps, but not always, so that one of the things when
we talk about these sub-cellular changes and things like
that, this is an area where I would think science is going
to be headed, and it’s quite skimpy now, is can you tell a
difference between a sub-cellular effect that is caused by
chemical A versus one that’s caused by chemical B, because
if you can, then it supports the proposition that maybe one
defendant is liable but not the other on the causation issue?
In terms of the water providers, the issue you raised,
John, comes up every day because defendants argue: “Wait
a minute, you have to treat your water anyway. You have
to treat your water because there is all sorts of stuff in it.”

John Guttmann: And just make a comment because there
is something I wanted to bring up that I thought was sort
of interesting and I overlooked it, frankly, earlier.
We’ve talked about the Deepwater Horizon situation in
which Carla’s firm is involved—we’re not—and the structure of settlements there where causation, essentially, if you
fall under certain buckets, causation will be presumed.
And Bob also mentioned the Allen case, where the district court went in that direction. Carla and I have been
involved in negotiating settlements in which all of these
kinds of things come into play where the issue arises, okay,
we can deal with what’s in front of us today by negotiating a settlement amount or a court or a jury decides it, but
what about the things that might happen tomorrow? These
cases are so complex and so costly to litigate for everybody
and involve so many different plaintiffs.
In the MTBE context, we’ve had well over 100 cases,
and each one is very, very large in terms of what’s at stake
when you’re talking about water providers, class actions, all
these things, that what this does often is drive parties to
settlements along those lines. And so, the parties have said,
okay, how are we going to create a mechanism for dealing with the next one that comes up, the next well where
there’s contamination? And we’ll sort of agree upon a reasonable resolution to some of these issues in the context of
a settlement.
If a well is contaminated to a certain level that the water
providers and the defendants will agree upon for some purposes, then the following comes into play. And you might
have complex structures, you might have simple ones, but
lots of these cases, because of what’s at stake for everybody
and the cost of dealing with them, are ultimately resolved
through settlement and those kinds of mechanisms, you
sort of put the MCL to the side. You say, okay, now we have
to sit around a table and figure out a way to resolve this.
And I think that’s what has happened, as I understand it,
in the Deepwater situation.
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Robert Percival: I just realized I did not answer your
question about the difference between displacement and
preemption. The issue the Court addressed in American
Electric Power was whether the CAA displaced the federal
common law of nuisance. The Court held that it had been
displaced by the CAA and EPA’s ability to regulate GHGs.
In that circumstance, it is one branch of government, Congress, passing the law that then displaces the federal common law that otherwise would be formulated by another
branch of government, the judiciary.
Preemption comes in when the issue is whether or not
Congress intended to use the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution to preempt state common law. The Court in
American Electric Power expressly did not reach that issue.
So, theoretically, climate change cases can still be brought
with the same kind of litigation using the state commonlaw claims.
Audience Member: My question is in tort litigation. How
helpful or unhelpful is biomonitoring, such as what the
CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] does?
Carla Burke: Okay. I’m going to have to ask you a question first. What types of monitoring is CDC doing?
Audience Member: Well, they’re monitoring for various
chemicals, and they do a program that can be 152 chemicals, or it can be 10. And they’re looking for it statistically,
not individually.
Carla Burke: Okay, so it’s more of an epidemiological
study. In a given population, we see X blood level of lead or
something else. It’s certainly instructive, but, as John said,
you would have to draw an inference from that. And in the
tort system, it’s not so much about what happened to the
community; it’s what happened to me. So, I could be that
one person in the community that’s not exposed to something for whatever reason. We would have to go beyond
and put me, put the plaintiff, in the exact circumstances as
someone who is comparable.
So, for children, I’m going to use lead, even though I
really don’t know much about lead paint cases. If you can
show that there’s lead paint in the home or that there is
flaking of lead paint on a windowsill or that there’s lead in
the carpet or leaded dust in the attic or something like that,
that ties it to that individual, that’s what you would need to
do in the tort system.
Audience Member: And biomonitoring can be done on
an individual?
Carla Burke: Sure.
John Guttmann: When you look at it on an individual
basis, that’s getting into the kind of thing I was talking
about where, whether it’s blood test or a genetic test, saliva,
it all depends on what you’re talking about. Is the chemical
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present in the body of a specific individual? And that’s one
category of proof. And if it’s there, it’s there. And the issue
might be, at what levels? But if it’s there, it’s there.
I think Carla is right, though, when she’s talking about
epidemiological studies, which are basically used to establish levels of risk. They provide some, but limited, probative
value in the typical case on whether the chemical is in my
body. And there, it’s dealt with typically in two ways. One
is, what you mentioned, the kind of testing that is focused
on me as an individual. The second is plaintiffs will talk
about the factors I mentioned before, frequency of exposure, regularity, proximity to the source of contamination,
depending on what you’re talking about, things like that.
To argue that essentially there’s circumstantial evidence
that makes the case that this particular plaintiff must have
been exposed and it must be in the body. Sometimes plaintiffs prevail with those kinds of arguments; sometimes they
do not. It really depends on the scope of the evidence.
John Cruden: But, John, how about class actions? Deepwater Horizon is a good example of a case where it was a combination. Some of those were individual lawsuits where people
said, I became sick from breathing oil fumes or touching oil
fumes. But others were, in fact, a class action where you have
a whole body of cases. How is that epidemiological data relevant there in those Rule 23 sorts of situations?
John Guttmann: Well, then the issue is, is it appropriate that this case be certified as a class action that turns
on many factors, including whether the class representatives—the punitive representatives, I should say, since the
class hasn’t been certified—are seeking money damages or
just injunctive relief. That’s a key factor because it’s a whole
different analysis. But the basic argument is what we’ve
been talking about.
The question becomes, does that epidemiological evidence, does that statistical evidence suffice to make the
case that individual inquiries are not needed? Therefore,
the common questions predominate or at least that the
common questions can be dealt with in a first phase trial
or something and the individual inquiries can be dealt
with later. That’s another way in which plaintiffs sometimes approach it. Defendants disagree that that type of
approach should be applied.
But, at the end of the day, it is hard, by and large,
although there are examples to the contrary, to get a case
certified involving toxic tort issues as a class action because
of what we’re talking about. The need to look at exposure
and causation on an individual basis as well as what’s the
injury? Is there an injury?
Audience Member: I want to follow up on that issue, and
I guess my first question is, when the Tenth Circuit in
Allen reversed the district court decision, did they address
the causation? As you know, they found it unnecessary to
address it. But, because the case has been reversed, it’s no
longer a good law. What’s going to happen in the element
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of causation going forward as you have more litigation over
sort of mass tort claims? Do you think that Allen or the
Deepwater Horizon lessening of the causation standard
would become more common, or are those outliers that
aren’t going anywhere?
John Guttmann: I believe that if it becomes more common, it’s going to be through legislation, because I think
the way our system is designed is to basically say that a
plaintiff has the burden of proof of showing an injury and
showing that it was caused by the defendant. And there
may be changes in how one proves an injury, but at the end
of the day, the plaintiff has to prove, I am injured, and it is
more likely than not that it was caused by this defendant.
Robert Percival: But when you have massive complex litigation with multiple parties, typically a court will try to
sample claims as a way of facilitating settlements to avoid
having to individually litigate thousands and thousands of
claims. I believe that trend will continue.
John Guttmann: Fair point. That gets back into what I
was talking about before, which is lots of these things are
settled and mechanisms are created, and they’re created ad
hoc sometimes, and then those ad hoc creations become
models, and the Deepwater Horizon may be one as things
go forward for how to deal with these complex issues.
Audience Member: I have a question for Carla. I was
struck by one of the things you said earlier, which was that
low levels of atrazine are much more dangerous than high
levels. Could you explain that?
Carla Burke: Sure. I said earlier in my remarks that atrazine, which is an herbicide, is an endocrine disruptor. I’ve
been asked to put my biologist hat on and explain why.
So, I’ll do the best I can. In fact, next month, there will
be published in Endocrine Reviews an article that does this
analysis of atrazine and other endocrine disruptors and sort
of looks at this in a way that you might want to see after
you hear my very amateur remarks.
What is interesting about endocrine-disrupting chemicals is that I think they’re the first group to get the attention as behaving differently. So, in a time where we’ve lost
a planet and science is going crazy, there’s also this recognition that there are chemicals that behave in the body in
ways that just don’t make sense, given the traditional toxicology. So, with atrazine, the study found that with frogs,
when you give frogs a little bit of atrazine, they exhibit
hormonal changes. It actually feminizes male frogs and
some frogs develop both female and male sex organs,
which is very strange. At high levels, the frogs don’t
have that response. It’s strange. I mean, it’s a whole new
world, but look at the article that’s coming out in June;
that might help.
So, I think that’s one of the things where we need to,
you know, as litigators we’re going to have to figure out
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how to deal with that. I don’t know how many of you practice in federal court, but if you’re familiar with the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, the reference manual
says, in most cases, chemicals follow this dose response
curve. That’s traditional toxicology. And it goes on to say
not everything follows that curve; some things are a little
different. But then it cites a case that says we got to stick to
the traditional.
So, courts are going to be all over the place, and this is
definitely emerging science. It’s one of the things that came
up in the atrazine litigation, given that we did fight over
the MCL, and whether one part per billion of atrazine in
the water was dangerous or could be a reasonable basis for
a water provider to install treatment or filtration, so it came
up there clearly. And it’s come to EPA’s attention, and EPA
is doing a special review now of atrazine and of the related
compounds. So, there may be things on EPA’s website as
well. I’m sure there are in the public docket for all of the
materials that have been submitted to EPA to consider with
atrazine. There’s a ton of science that has been submitted,
so check that out.
A lot of courts have allowed single-molecule testimony,
especially in asbestos cases with mesothelioma. That’s tended
to be thought of as a potentially single-molecule response.
With atrazine, there was a case in Louisiana. It’s the Iberville
Parish Waterworks case in Louisiana, 1999 maybe. I don’t
know if they got to the point of doing expert testimony to
that level, but that might be in the docket for that.
John Cruden: Bob, I’m going to you for a second because
we have now got into the world of good science. If there is
anything we know and that is every legislator, every judge,
every plaintiff, every defendant is wedded to the concept
of good science, they probably mean different things, each
of them, but they are all wedded to that concept. And the
Supreme Court said, in Daubert, we’re going to be the
gatekeeper of good science, but this stuff is now evolving at
such a rate as we’ve just seen recently now and DNA results
coming up. Is that working? Is Daubert effective particularly in this world where it’s moving so quickly?
Robert Percival: I think Daubert was a classic Justice Harry
Blackmun opinion. The actual issue before the Court when
the case was argued was whether or not one can even testify about novel theories, or if they have to be generally
accepted at the time, which is what the lower court ruled.
The Supreme Court did not agree, so in theory, the decision was supposed to permit more types of evidence to be
admitted. However, because Justice Blackmun’s majority
opinion lectured the lower courts on the importance of
being gatekeepers, I think the perception is that it actually
tended to result in more judges feeling like they have to
keep more types of evidence out.
It is kind of ironic, though, when you look at the history of the use of science in some of these cases involving products liability and the like. The original purveyors
of junk science were really tobacco manufacturers, who
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went to great lengths to manipulate data to cloud any link
between their product and lung cancer. When that failed,
they then got Congress to provide them with an automatic
assumption of risk defense by mandating warning labels.
Regarding the climate change litigation, some have argued
that we are now going to see junk science provided by the
defendants in an attempt to dispute the notion that GHG
emissions are causing climate change.
Audience Member: Given the remark about the causation
conundrum and the advancements of science, is it time to
advance law and change causation? It sounds like Dr. Percival is suggesting that Allen is the way to go. If you have
manufacturers who tend to have more data, is there a product that goes into the environment to unwilling recipients
perhaps? If you can show exposure, can the causation burden flip? And then be on the defendant to show that they
even cause harm?
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John Guttmann: Maybe. I’ll go back to where we started
talking about causation, and dose, and exposure, and does
my one instance where I had exposure to whatever it is,
MTBE, or lead, or pick anything else, is that sufficient?
In the case of asbestos, the answer would be yes, if you’ve
got mesothelioma. But in other contexts, not necessarily,
unless the plaintiff has the burden of proof.
You have to remember also that these are—when we’re
talking toxic tort, we’re talking of things where emotions
and feelings are very, very significant, and that’s one of the
things that comes into play in all these cases. It’s also one
of the things that leads to these settlements that we’re talking about.
John Cruden: Carla, what other types of chemicals have
you been working on with your client? And do they actually create other legal issues to be discussed?

John Guttmann: From my perspective, the answer, as a
general rule at least, is no, and the reason for that is that the
reality is that something like asbestos, where there is a signature disease that results, actually a couple of them, is the
exception rather than the rule. So, that for example, Carla
mentioned lead issues earlier, and there is no question that
lead is not good for you, but plaintiffs will argue that lead
causes children to develop developmental issues—ADD,
ADHD. In the case of a particular child, that may very
well be demonstrable. But in the case of another child, it
may not be, because you might have a family history. There
might be a multitude of other factors that can come into
play, but genetics and family history being a significant
component of it.
And from where I sit, that kind of thing is out there
in most cases, or put differently, few cases are like mesothelioma in asbestos. In a litigated context, as opposed
to settlement, where as we talked about everybody just
says forget about this stuff, there is too much at stake.
There’s too much involved. And maybe there’s a public
health issue. We’re going to come up with our own way of
dealing with it. Put that to the side. In a litigated context,
I think at the end of the day, the types of proof that are
available, scientific or otherwise ,for a plaintiff to make
the case may change.
Certainly, as science changes, it can go both ways. It
sometimes becomes easier for a plaintiff to prove the case.
It could also become more difficult in some contexts. So,
there’s always going to be changes, but I think when you
have multiple things that can cause the harm, I don’t see it
happening in a common-law context. Now, what Congress
might decide to do or a state legislature is a whole other
issue, and I don’t know about that.

Carla Burke: Of the, say, 7,500 water contaminants that
EPA has identified as, hey, we might need to regulate this
at some point, there are only enforceable MCLs for about
90. So, the argument that we tend to hear about following
the regulations and being in this level or at a level where a
water provider is not injured, that argument doesn’t apply,
of course, if you have an unregulated chemical.
One example is a case that we worked on a few years ago
involving a chemical called PFOA or C8, which has gotten
a lot of attention. There are these perfluorinated carbons
that are used in paper processing, microwave popcorn, the
package of the microwave popcorn comes in, Teflon pans,
and nonstick carpet, and those kinds of things that have a
sleek, nonsticky surface. Those are not regulated by EPA or
by most states.
We had a case in the state of Florida, and EPA has
issued a public health advisory level for PFOA. But anyway, Florida did not have an enforceable MCL, and EPA
did not. So, in that context, with an unregulated chemical, the arguments changed slightly. I mean, it does takes
some of the wind out of the sails of being below the MCL
so it’s somehow safe, and if there’s a public health advisory
that can be instructive, but it doesn’t have the weight of an
enforceable regulation.
To answer your first question, the other chemicals are
perchlorethylene, which is used in dry cleaning, trichloroethylene, which is an industrial solvent that’s found in
lots of chemicals. Gasoline byproducts tend to be so commonly found because we all drive obsessively, so benzene
or xylene or toluene. And again, we have these atrazine
cases that are most concentrated in the Midwest, in the
corn-growing states, so a huge cluster of them in the Midwest and there is some atrazine found in California, but it’s
pretty severe in agricultural areas.

Robert Percival: But if you could show a genetic predisposition to get that disease, isn’t that a case where you
could discharge a burden of showing that it was not in
fact the cause?

John Cruden: John, when Carla was talking about bringing her lawsuit, she said, actually I could have sued those
local gasoline places, but that’s not fun. Let’s go after the
big guys. Let’s go after refineries and things. But is that
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relevant to this discussion, who you sue? I mean, if you’re
representing the big guy, do you want to take it out on the
little guys too?
John Guttmann: Well, taking it out on little guys is one
thing; suggesting that the little guys are really the cause
of the injuries is another. And talking as Carla was about
the MTBE context where the typical source is a gas station
that’s had a leak, the refiners have argued that the source
of the contamination is typically a tank, and if the owner
of the gas station didn’t follow the regulations to maintain
the tank properly, there’s an intervening cause. The product is not defective to begin with. But even if it is, there’s
an intervening cause that caused the harm.
Judge Scheindlin has, by and large, disagreed with
that, because she said, look, it’s a product liability case,
and the issue that the plaintiffs are raising is the way the
chemical behaves in the environment. But that kind of
thing is front and center in the lot of these cases and also
involving other chemicals.
John Cruden: Carla, as a plaintiff, you’re speaking in terms
of most often a single chemical. You’re talking for instance
about MBTE, but is there an argument that the mixture,
the synergistic effect of that chemical as it interacts with
other chemicals could have a larger effect, an effect that
even goes beyond what other regulatory restraints exist?
Carla Burke: Sure. That’s one thing that has been, let’s
say, in the last few years, really discussed in environmental
scientific circles. It’s called the cocktail theory. It sounds
more glamorous than it is, but it is the idea that if a person
is exposed to different chemicals at the same time, might
there be an additive effect, might there be a synergistic
effect, might one chemical make the body more vulnerable
to a different chemical acting a different way, and I have no
answers sitting here.
I mean, common sense would tell me that it’s much different, but I don’t have science to point you all to. But that
is something that we have seen especially recently with
EPA and atrazine. EPA has said, okay, we want the makers
of atrazine; let’s address not only the effects of atrazine in
the environment, but we know that atrazine comes sort of
in a package with these related chemicals. It degrades a bit
in the environment, and the degradant products should
be—we should look at all of them together because they
persist a little bit as well. So, you add atrazine to water
and you actually get three or four chemicals in the water
because of the degradation process. So, that is a current
event. I think it’s actually a future event that will get more
attention as we go along.
John Guttmann: I think it is a future event. I agree with
Carla. I think it’s something where there’s a lot of research,
and it’s very important. It’s going to be important to these
cases as they go on. I don’t know. I’m sure it’s there in some
situations. I’m sure there are situations where people are

42 ELR 10799

looking at it and they’re going to say, no, it’s not there. I
couldn’t tell you what ones are what.

V.

Closing Remarks

Robert Percival: The world is obviously a very different
place than it was hundreds of years ago when the British
common-law courts started dealing with environmental
tort cases. That is why we shifted to a system in which
we largely rely on preventative regulation rather than the
tort system to provide us with environmental protection.
Despite the fact that it is so difficult to prove causation in
the modern era, it is still absolutely vital to have the tort
system as that backstop.
So-called tort reformers have argued that approval of a
product by a regulatory agency should insulate the manufacturer from tort liability. I think that is extremely dangerous, because it would create an incentive for companies
to lobby for riskier things to be approved since there would
be no liability if it ends up harming people. That is why it
is essential for the tort system to be available: to provide
some avenue of redress when the regulatory system fails to
prevent serious environmental harm.
Carla Burke: I couldn’t agree more. I would add that any
of the new more creative theories that are applied in the tort
system, whether it’s a rebuttable presumption of causation,
it seems a pretty good balance, again, from the plaintiff’s
perspective, of allowing businesses to exercise their rights
to sell their products pretty freely in the United States and
for them to bear some of the burden of the environmental
contamination that happens inevitably.
We never said, gee, you have to stop selling gas or you
have to sell it in these hermetically sealed containers. Everyone understands that some contaminants are going to be in
the environment. The question is who has to pay for them
to be removed from the environment? Is it taxpayers, is it
the ratepayers who pay their water bills, or should corporations absorb that cost as part of the cost of doing business?
Obviously, that’s where we come up.
John Guttmann: Or should it be the person who released
it into the environment? I’m just going to stop where I
think Bob started, which is causation is the issue with all
these things, whatever the context, but you have to look at
it and say what kind of plaintiff am I talking about? What
does that mean? What kind of injury is being alleged here?
Does this kind of plaintiff have the claim for this kind of
injury at this low level? Look to see if the argument, the
ability to find the stuff, is getting ahead of the science in
other respects in assessing what the plaintiff puts forward
to establish the case. And that the key thing, as we’ve come
back to now a couple of times, is that the science is evolving
and the claims may be ahead of the science and the claims
will change with the science in terms of injury allegations
and legal theories.

